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Product innovation drives organizational change and 
growth (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009; Dougherty & Hardy, 
1996) and is therefore considered an important compo-
nent of corporate entrepreneurship (Branzei & Vertinsky, 
2006; Covin & Slevin, 1991) and a major determinant of 
firms’ competitive advantage and performance (Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1995; Ernst, 2002). Recently, researchers 
have paid great attention to product innovation in family 
firms (De Massis, Di Minin, & Frattini, 2015; De 
Massis, Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2013). This body of 
research suggests that the distinctive attributes of family 
governance, including centralized authority structures, 
incentives for parsimonious use of resources, and asym-
metrical accountability norms (Carney, 2005; 
Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012; 
Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004), can be major 
impediments to family firms’ innovativeness (De Massis 
et al., 2013). For example, family firms are reported to 
engage less in R&D investments (Block, 2012; Chrisman 
& Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Kotlar, De 
Massis, Fang, & Frattini, 2014), technology acquisitions 
(Kammerlander & Ganter, 2015; König, Kammerlander, 
& Enders, 2013; Kotlar, De Massis, Frattini, Bianchi, & 
Fang, 2013) and open innovation (Classen, Van Gils, 
Bammens, & Carree, 2012; Nieto, Santamaria, & 
Fernandez, 2015) than nonfamily firms. Accordingly, 
many scholars concur that “old, moneyed families block 
creative destruction among their own firms” (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003, p. 377) and that “for some family firms, 
maintaining family control may be a higher priority than 
innovating” (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007, p. 134). However, 
if family firms innovate less then we should see them 
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diminish as an organizational form over time. Patel and 
Chrisman’s (2014) research suggests that the reason 
they continue to flourish is that they follow different 
innovation strategies than nonfamily firms and, when 
necessary, are able to change strategies more rapidly 
owing to their concentrated control. If family firms fol-
low different strategies then it is also likely that they use 
different organizational designs to implement their inno-
vation programs. But the nature of these differences, if 
any, is unknown.
Existing research has made substantial strides on the 
macro-level focusing on the different innovation strate-
gies adopted by family firms and the impact of family 
involvement on innovation inputs and outputs. However, 
by adopting a strategic perspective primarily focused on 
examining differences in innovation across types of 
firms, existing work has largely overlooked the micro-
perspective of the design of innovation activities within 
organizations (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Dougherty & 
Hardy, 1996). The few exceptions to this trend (e.g., 
Cassia, De Massis, & Pizzurno, 2011; De Massis, 
Frattini, Pizzurno, & Cassia, 2015) have explored fac-
tors that hinder or facilitate innovation activities in fam-
ily firms, but have not provided sufficient depth about 
the underlying organizational mechanisms. Thus, we are 
left with limited understanding about how family firms 
implement their innovation strategies and how innova-
tion activities can be organized at the micro-level to fit 
their governance attributes (for a recent review, see De 
Massis et al., 2013).
This study aims at complementing and extending 
existing research on family firm innovation by taking a 
design perspective. It is based on the idea that family 
firms can be highly innovative while still maintaining a 
strong family character (Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and 
that lower innovation inputs do not necessarily translate 
into lower innovation outputs (Duran, Kammerlander, 
van Essen, & Zellweger, 2015). Based on these prem-
ises, this study attempts to extend current theory on 
innovation in family firms in three major respects. First, 
the study complements prior empirical studies on the 
effect of family governance on product innovation, 
which have been primarily quantitative in nature, 
focused on innovation input and outputs, and based on 
overly simplistic assumptions about how family gover-
nance influences innovation (e.g., Block, 2012; Chin, 
Chen, Kleinman, & Lee, 2009; Czarnitzki & Kraft, 
2009; De Massis et al., 2013; Duran et al., 2015). In par-
ticular, this study aims at clarifying the mechanisms 
through which family governance can obstruct or facili-
tate innovation processes, and to extend and refine exist-
ing theory as to how family firms can best accommodate 
and leverage their governance attributes in order to max-
imize their innovative potential. Second, prior research 
has for the most part focused on broad aspects of inno-
vation such as innovation inputs (e.g., R&D invest-
ments) and outputs (e.g., patents; De Massis et al., 2013; 
Duran et al., 2015), and on firm-level explanatory vari-
ables such as prior performance (e.g., Patel & Chrisman, 
2014) and resources (e.g., Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). On the 
other hand, a deeper understanding of the variables that 
relate to product innovation program design is likely to 
unveil new sources of variation among family firms and 
add much to our understanding of innovation manage-
ment in family firms. Third, there are few empirically 
grounded, theoretical accounts of the organizational 
choices that family firms can take to organize high-per-
forming new product development (NPD) programs.
Taken together, these gaps in the literature led us to 
address the following research question: How do family 
firms design NPD programs that fit their governance 
systems and perform at high levels? Given limited the-
ory and empirical evidence and given the explanatory 
nature of our research questions, we conduct a qualita-
tive analysis of multiple case studies (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). This method is particularly appropriate 
when the purpose is to extend and refine existing con-
structs and relationships, when the research aims at 
explaining how they work (or not) in a particular con-
text, and when access to fine-grained information is not 
available in existing databases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2003). Our study examines six small- and 
medium-size (small and medium enterprises [SME]) 
family firms, chosen to ensure they embodied the family 
form of governance (each was characterized by family 
ownership, family management, and close overlap 
between family and business) and had an NPD program 
(a multiyear, budget-backed portfolio of NPD projects). 
These criteria, along with a polar-sampling approach 
based on NPD performance, were used to study sources 
of variance in the dimensions of product innovation pro-
gram design that differentiate higher from lower per-
forming family SMEs.
Our study represents the first step toward extending 
and refining existing theory and research on innovation 
in family firms by identifying and clarifying three major 
NPD design principles concerning teams, leadership, 
and incentives (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Cooper & 
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Kleinschmidt, 1995) that together constitute a logically 
consistent way of organizing NPD programs in family 
SMEs. It identifies new dimensions that add to existing 
NPD design principles developed in large nonfamily 
firms, and extend conventional approaches to NPD 
design in important ways in order to accommodate the 
governance attributes of family SMEs. The findings of 
this study suggest that the product innovation perfor-
mance of family SMEs depends on how well the design 
of NPD programs fits their governance attributes, and 
that such fit depends on dimensions of NPD design that 
have been overlooked in existing research, such as orga-
nization of NPD teams by relying on existing depart-
mental structures and employing resources on a part-time 
basis, separation of leadership and championing roles, 
and application of intrinsic incentives in place of extrin-
sic incentives to foster teamwork and achieve stronger 
goal alignment. Thus, we provide a theoretical explana-
tion, inducted from empirical evidence, for the distinc-
tive organizational challenges that family governance 
poses for product innovation, and shed light on how 
family SMEs address those challenges in practice. By 
doing so, our study highlights unique requirements for 
successful NPD programs in family SMEs, which refine 
and extend classic approaches to NPD design.
Background
Prior research on family governance and NPD provides 
the context for this study. This section first discusses the 
governance attributes that characterize family SMEs 
and their links to innovation and then reviews the orga-
nizational aspects that are most relevant to NPD 
activities.
Family Governance as an Organizing 
Framework for NPD
We define family governance in terms of authority struc-
tures, incentive systems, and accountability norms 
(Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). First, family 
governance depends on the personalization of authority 
among members of the family both in terms of owner-
ship and management (Carney, 2005; Daily & Dollinger, 
1992). As such, authority relationships tend to be cen-
tralized (Gedajlovic et al., 2004), and to resemble the 
authority structure of the family (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). 
Concentrated ownership (especially when the firm is 
privately held) reduces pressures for disclosure and 
transparency (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; 
Pazzaglia, Mengoli, & Sapienza, 2013) and internal 
bureaucratic constraints that limit managerial authority 
(Carney, 2005). Unconstrained authority also creates 
noneconomic utilities for controlling families. Thus, 
family owners and managers tend to prefer informal 
decision-making processes and organization structures 
that allow them to avoid ceding power to nonfamily 
managers (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014; Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992).
A second key feature of family governance is the pur-
suit of family-centered goals, including intentions for 
continued family control and survival as a family firm 
(Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía, 2012; Kotlar & De 
Massis, 2013), which tend to take precedence over pure 
profit or growth maximization and are more difficult to 
measure (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Zellweger, 
Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). As controlling 
families are reluctant to reduce their ownership stake in 
the firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 
2012), they must rely heavily on family investments and 
internally generated cash flows to fund growth. As a 
result, family governance also creates incentives for 
efficiency and parsimony (Gedajlovic et al., 2004).
Third, family governance often allows for the altruis-
tic treatment of family members, which brings about 
very ambiguous accountability norms (Jaskiewicz, 
Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013; Pazzaglia et al., 
2013; Schulze et al., 2001). Family members are often 
not held fully accountable for their actions (Gedajlovic 
et al., 2004). On the other hand, nonfamily employees 
are often considered as outsiders or agents who are nei-
ther treated as altruistically as family members nor 
trusted to behave benevolently toward the family or 
business (Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra, 2010; 
Gómez-Mejía, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). As 
such, family governance can engender bifurcation bias, 
where family and nonfamily employees are held to dif-
ferent standards, with favoritism often shown to the for-
mer over the latter (Verbeke & Kano, 2012).
In sum, prior literature provides important insights 
into the role of family governance as a unique organiz-
ing environment. How this distinctive form of gover-
nance affects the performance of activities that involve 
such a high degree of novelty, uncertainty, and complex-
ity as NPD, however, remains largely unanswered 
(Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, & Wright, 2015). 
Prior research has shown that family governance often 
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inhibits investments in innovation (e.g., Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Kotlar, Fang, De 
Massis, & Frattini, 2014), but that lower innovation 
inputs do not necessarily translate into lower innovation 
performance in family firms (Block, 2012; Duran et al., 
2015). In fact, research continues to be divided as to 
whether family governance has an overall positive or 
negative effect on innovation performance (Chin et al., 
2009; Czarnitzki & Kraft, 2009; Sciascia, Nordqvist, 
Mazzola, & De Massis, 2015). Prior research has also 
shown that family-related variables, such as family 
social capital, relationship conflict, and family affective 
commitment exert important effects on product innova-
tion performance (Cassia et al., 2011; Chirico & Salvato, 
2014). For example, De Massis, Frattini, et al. (2015) 
note that family influence constraints the composition 
and autonomy of innovation project teams. Similarly, 
Cassia et al. (2011) identify several dimensions along 
which the family can enable or constraint innovation. 
Yet existing studies are confined to limited areas of 
innovation project design (i.e., the team), and do not 
offer sufficient depth about the mechanisms underlying 
the fit between NPD programs and the governance attri-
butes of family SMEs (De Massis, Di Minin, et al., 
2015). In the next section, we draw more thoroughly 
from research on NPD design to lay the groundwork for 
constructs and relationships to look for in our empirical 
study.
Organizational Design for NPD
Innovation scholarship has a long tradition of research 
that focuses on how new products are developed within 
organizations (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Cardinal, 
Turner, Fern, & Burton, 2011; Dougherty & Hardy, 
1996). Scholars within this tradition have embraced het-
erogeneous theoretical lenses as well as empirical 
approaches. For our purposes, we draw on an integrative 
model developed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995). 
Although not the only way to characterize product inno-
vation activities, the three categories outlined by Brown 
and Eisenhardt (1995) draw attention to important prob-
lem areas internal to an organization: the design of the 
project team, project leadership, and incentive systems 
required for NPD success. Each is discussed below.
NPD teams have been the focus of most product 
development research, and are a central design aspect of 
NPD (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). In this regard, prior 
research emphasizes the importance of team composi-
tion (Bhuiyan, Gerwin, & Thomson, 2004; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Cardinal et al., 2011). Higher func-
tional diversity among team members is thought to 
increase the amount and variety of information available 
to the team, thereby facilitating the processes through 
which new information is used (Clark & Fujimoto, 
1991; Keller, 2001; Van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003). 
This, in turn, improves the quality of the development 
process and leads to higher performance (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995). A further aspect of NPD teams 
emphasized in prior research is the necessity for close 
interaction among team members, which permits the 
overlap of development phases and may quicken the 
execution of complex problem-solving tasks that char-
acterize NPD (Clark & Wheelwright, 1992). This sug-
gests that innovation performance is higher when NPD 
is organized through dedicated teams, which have func-
tional interaction on a full-time basis during the course 
of a project (Bhuiyan et al., 2004).
Project leaders play a pivotal role as well, because 
they act as bridges between teams and senior manage-
ment (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Somech, 2006). Prior 
research has highlighted at least three functions carried 
out by NPD project leaders (Ernst, 2002; Howell & 
Higgins, 1990). First, project leaders must match a 
firm’s competences and resources with market needs to 
increase the chances of NPD success (Lewis, Welsh, 
Dehler, & Green, 2002; Sarin & McDermott, 2003). 
Second, project leaders need the skills to manage the 
project (Lewis et al., 2002). Finally, project leaders must 
act as champions for the innovation program, a function 
that includes lobbying for resources, protecting teams 
from outside interference, and managing relationships 
with senior management (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; 
Shane, Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1995). The design 
of leadership roles and responsibilities is therefore cru-
cial to ensure that project leaders are able to carry out 
the functions listed above. This, in turn, will increase the 
speed and effectiveness of NPD processes (Clark & 
Fujimoto, 1991).
Incentives provided by senior managers are also criti-
cal to the support and supervision of the NPD process 
(Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987). Support refers to the 
provision of resources to NPD teams when needed 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). Supervision involves 
efforts to foster motivation and commitment among 
team members and project leaders, which is typically 
attained through the provision of extrinsic incentives in 
the form of monetary rewards directly linked to NPD 
performance (Ernst, 2002; Schilling & Hill, 1998). In 
the extant literature on organizational design for NPD, 
 by guest on January 7, 2016fbr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
De Massis et al. 5
the use of extrinsic incentives emerges as crucial for 
ensuring that NPD team members and project leaders 
are committed to project goals and accountable for proj-
ect performance (Griffin, 1997; Page, 1993). Prior 
research also points to the importance of intrinsic moti-
vation in complex tasks involving innovation and cre-
ativity (e.g., Amabile, 1983, 1993), but such work has 
not examined how such intrinsic motivation can be 
attained in the context of NPD programs.
The design principles outlined above emerge from 
empirical work that has been primarily conducted in the 
context of large, mature corporations (e.g., Cooper, 
Edgett, & Kleinschmidt, 2004a, 2004b; Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995) or through computer-assisted sim-
ulations (e.g., Bhuiyan et al., 2004; Cardinal et al., 
2011). There is increasing recognition among scholars, 
however, that these design principles may not have uni-
versal applicability, because the effectiveness of NPD 
design decisions might vary substantially based on how 
well the program is connected to the structure and strate-
gies of the organization (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). In 
this regard, some authors note that the resource con-
straints of SMEs can entail different requirements for 
the innovation management process (Rosenbusch, 
Brinckmann, & Bausch, 2011). Also, recent studies have 
shown that some well-established design principles, 
such as interfunctional coordination, are not always 
needed in SMEs (e.g., Ledwith & O’Dwyer, 2009; 
O’Dwyer & Ledwith, 2009). Still, even though family 
governance is prominent among SMEs (e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999), prior NPD 
research largely overlooks the governance attributes of 
family SMEs and the unique challenges for the manage-
ment of innovation in these firms (Block, Miller, 
Jaskiewicz, & Spiegel, 2013; König et al., 2013). To 
refine and extend current understanding of these issues, 
in the next sections, we present our study of six family 
SMEs which points to the innovation activities and the 
design decisions that discriminate higher from lower 
performing NPD programs.
Method
The research method we adopted is theory building from 
multiple cases (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003). This 
method is designed to develop explanatory theory about 
phenomena that have not been well-explored from con-
sistent patterns of data using replication logic, in which 
a series of case studies functions as a set of experiments 
that each serve to confirm or disconfirm an emergent 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Numagami, 1998; Yin, 2003). 
We focus on manufacturing firms because the product 
lines of such firms must be frequently improved and 
expanded, making the capacity to develop and introduce 
new products crucial for business development and sur-
vival. We focus on SMEs because family governance is 
likely to be more pronounced and important in influenc-
ing behaviors in smaller firms (e.g., Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson, & Barnett, 2012).
We initially identified 15 firms through personal con-
tacts and interviews with experts working with family 
firms. We then contacted each firm and interviewed the 
CEO to collect information on the criteria that allowed 
us to identify family SMEs. The final sample comprises 
six companies that were selected based on a theoretical 
sampling approach (e.g., Cardinal et al., 2011; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) as described below.
Consistent with the research question outlined above, 
our case selection process aimed at examining variations 
in NPD design and NPD performance while keeping 
governance attributes constant. Therefore, we selected 
firms that reflected the set of governance attributes that 
characterize family SMEs, according to information col-
lected in our preliminary interviews. More specifically, 
we followed Carney (2005) in examining firms where 
ownership and control is concentrated in the person of 
an owner-manager or family. This was operationalized 
by selecting firms where members of the family have 
50% or more of the ordinary voting shares and accounted 
for 50% or more of the management team. As a verifica-
tion, we also asked the CEO whether the company is a 
family business (e.g., Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). By 
doing so, we ensured that all selected firms are charac-
terized by high concentration of organizational authority 
in the hands of the family (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 
2003), and that the family and business are closely inter-
twined, indicating the potential for asymmetrical 
accountability norms (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
Moreover, we chose family SMEs where the family has 
committed a significant portion of personal wealth to the 
firm, which is thought to provide incentives toward par-
simony (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).
Furthermore, because of its centrality to our theoreti-
cal inquiry, we also ensured that the firms selected 
devoted substantial efforts to product development 
through a multiyear NPD program. Consistent with the 
literature, we use several criteria to identify NPD 
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programs (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995). First, it must consist of a portfolio 
of NPD projects oriented toward the market introduction 
of new products. Second, it must have a multiyear bud-
get. Third, one or more senior managers must have 
responsibility for the entire program.
Finally, we ensured that the NPD program perfor-
mance of the firms we studied could be categorized as 
either high or low. Thus, we arrived at the final sample of 
six firms after eliminating two firms that were judged to 
have average levels of NPD program performance. Such 
polar-sampling makes the impact of the constructs of 
interest more “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1999), and is par-
ticularly appropriate when the objective is to gain insights 
into the main effects that are associated with success and 
failure (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002). The perfor-
mance of an NPD program can be defined by senior 
management’s assessments of whether it met its long-
term goals (e.g., Griffin, 1997) or by objective measures 
such as new product sales, change in market share, and 
change in operating margins (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1995). In the spirit of triangulating subjective and objec-
tive measures of performance, we preliminarily relied on 
subjective data obtained from knowledgeable informants 
such as senior managers who were initially asked if they 
were satisfied with overall performance at the end of the 
program (e.g., Thamhain, 1990). Objective information 
was also collected during the interview process (see 
below) and used to confirm the validity of our polar-sam-
pling approach. The analysis period ranged from 5 to 8 
years, and performance indicators were adjusted to take 
the different lengths of the programs into account. As 
noted above, the procedure yielded a sample of six cases 
that include three higher performing and three lower per-
forming firms (Eisenhardt, 1989).
As summarized in Table 1, the variations among the 
firms in terms of size, industry segment, and family 
generation(s) in charge is appropriate to ensure suffi-
cient robustness and analytical generalizability of results 
(Yin, 2003). Thus, among the higher performing firms, 
CastCo is a foundry in its fourth generation, MountCo is 
a sporting goods firms in the transition between the third 
and fourth generations, and PoolCo is a fiberglass firm 
managed by members of the first and second generation. 
Conversely, among the lower performing firms FabricCo 
competes in medical textiles and is managed by second 
and third generation family members, SecureCo is an 
electronics firm transitioning from the first to second 
generation, and BikeCo is a bicycle manufacturer run by 
the second generation of the owning family. Further 
details about the firms, including background informa-
tion, the analysis period, and the respective NPD pro-
grams, are reported in Table 2. The subjective and 
Table 1. Description of Case Data.














No. of family 
managers








Higher performing new product development programs
CastCo 340 68 Foundry 100% (9) Fourth 4 4 8 SM: 3 NPD: 5 
(FM: 3)
MountCo 160 33 Sporting 
goods
100% (2) Third and 
fourth
4 3 8 SM: 2 NPD: 6 
(FM: 5)
PoolCo 40 15 Fiberglass 70% (2) First and 
second
3 2 5 SM: 2 NPD: 3 
(FM: 3)
Lower performing new product development programs
FabricCo 390 79 Medical 
textile
85% (3) Second 
and third
4 2 9 SM: 4 NPD: 5 
(FM: 5)
SecureCo 95 22 Electronics 100% (5) First and 
second
5 1 7 SM: 2 NPD: 5 
(FM: 3)
BikeCo 45 8 Bikes 100% (2) Second 2 2 6 SM: 1 NPD: 5 
(FM: 3)
aThe real names of the companies have been disguised for confidentiality reasons. bCalculated as full-time equivalent employees. cSome informants were interviewed 
more than once, with 49 interviews being conducted. dSM = senior manager; NPD = within-NPD-program informant (e.g., project leader, team member). The value 
reported in brackets (FM) is the number of family members across the two informant types.
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objective measures of NPD performance for each case 
are shown in Table 3.
Data Collection
The primary source of data is 49 semistructured inter-
views with 43 informants. For each firm, we interviewed 
knowledgeable informants including senior managers 
(Chief Executive Officer, Chief Technology Officer, 
Heads of the Research and Development, Production, 
Marketing and Human Resource Departments, if exist-
ing) and people involved in product development pro-
grams. A minimum of five informants per firm, including 
at least three members of the family who own the com-
pany were interviewed. The interviews lasted between 1 
and 2 hours and were all tape recorded and transcribed. 
The topics and open-ended questions used in the inter-
views during the interviews are reported in the 

















2001-2008 Severe downturn in 
the domestic market; 
new CEO appointed 
in 2001
Expand the product portfolio 
to enter the North European 
market; adapt products to 
serve existing buyers who are 
moving to South Eastern Asia
€1.5 Million/











2001-2009 Emerging trend to 
reduce the weight 
of mountain sports 
equipment; need 
to introduce a new 
lightweight collection
New collections of innovative 
clothes; gain market share 
in the professional segment; 
remain attractive to the 
amateur market
€1.3 Million/










2003-2007 Several years of 
continuing growth; 
30% of equity sold to a 
client in the real estate 
industry
Introduce a new set of products 
for the real-estate industry; 
double revenues with new 
products; increase firm 
profitability through higher 
margins from new products
€3 Million; 13 
NPD projects




2003-2007 In 2003, a 5-year 
strategic plan was 
ratified to enter the 
consumer market.
Introduce new products with 
innovative functionalities 
for the consumer market; 
Integrate chemical treatments 
to the cloths; gain 10% market 
share in the consumer market











2004-2009 Interest in the emerging 
electronic systems 
market for domestic 
applications (home 
automation)
Introduce a new range of home 
automation products; gain 5% 
market share in Italy by 2009; 
obtain 50% of turnover from 
the new segment
€1 Million/
year; 15 NPD 
projects






2005-2010 Willingness to 
differentiate the 
company’sofferings
Double the firm’s revenues with 
new product sales; improve the 
firm’s profitability (a specific 
profit margin target was not 
defined)
€5 Million; 6 
NPD projects
Note. NPD = new product development.
aData refer to the beginning of the NPD program.
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Table 3. Performance Summary of Higher and Lower Performing NPD Programs.
Case 












Higher performing NPD programs
CastCo High 39 New products commercialized 11% n/a 12.50%
 13 New clients in North Europe  
 4 Clients served in Southeastern Asia  
MountCo High New range of clothing, over 15 products 20% 20% 20%
 23 Patents, 3 trademarks  
 Franchised professional shops  
PoolCo High 11 New products 33% 15% 20%
 Quintupled revenues  
 Improved dividends  
Lower performing NPD programs
FabricCo Low 2 New products for the consumer market 1% 0% 0%
 15% of sales from new products  
 Insignificant market share gained  
SecureCo Low 3 New home security systems 0% 2% 3%
 Limited market share in the new business  
 Stable revenues  
BikeCo Low Limited sales growth 0% 0%  −5%
 Profitability decreased  
aPreliminary information collected during the sample selection process. bRelative to aspirations expressed by senior management. cCompound 
annual growth rate referred to sales, in each NPD program’s period of analysis. dReferred to the NPD program’s period of analysis.
appendix. These questions allowed a structured exami-
nation of the cases and potential replication of the analy-
sis in future research (Yin, 2003).
Additional data on the management and organization 
of product development activities were collected through 
secondary sources such as balance sheets and project 
reports. These data were used to verify NPD outcomes 
(see Table 2 and Table 3), to gain insights into the charac-
teristics of the new products developed, as well as to assess 
information regarding NPD teams, individual roles within 
NPD projects, and incentives provided to team members 
and leaders. Triangulation of data on recent events from 
multiple informants and data sources is useful because it 
reduces retrospective and personal interpretation biases, 
enhances objectivity, and improves the robustness of the 
resulting theory (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).
Data Analysis
We used within-case and cross-case methods to analyze 
the case data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). We began by building individual case studies 
from transcripts and supplementary data. As a check, the 
first three authors read through the original interviews 
and formed an independent view of each case. We also 
followed up with informants to fill in details, clarify 
events, and resolve discrepancies. We then began cross-
case analysis to determine if there were consistent pat-
terns of relationships across all cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
As it is common in qualitative case research, we had no 
a priori hypotheses. We first compared the cases to iden-
tify common issues along the NPD categories discussed 
above and unearth unique aspects of each particular 
case. Following the approach suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1999) and relying on the general framework 
of key actors and processes in NPD (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995), we then created tables and graphs to 
facilitate case comparisons. For each dimension of NPD 
design (i.e., NPD teams, leadership, and senior manage-
ment), we compared random case pairings and pairings 
based on similar organizational characteristics (e.g., 
firm age, firm size, industry) to search for patterns. As 
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the analysis evolved, we raised the level of abstraction. 
As conceptual insights emerged, particularly differences 
in NPD design between higher and lower performing 
firms, we discussed these insights using a devil’s advo-
cacy method (Eisenhardt, 1989) to rule out alternative 
explanations. We also relied on other theoretical lenses 
(e.g., the taxonomy of Ernst, 2002) that enabled us to 
probe the emerging conceptual framework from many 
vantage points.
During the cross-case analysis, we iteratively ana-
lyzed the qualitative data by moving back and forth 
among the theory, data, and literature to adjust for 
emerging theoretical relationships (see Table 4, for an 
example of cross-case analysis). We used replication 
logic in which each case is treated as a separate experi-
ment such that theoretical relationships in one firm are 
verified with others (Yin, 2003). We continued this itera-
tive process until we achieved theoretical saturation, 
such that the emerging theory provides a consistent and 
robust explanation of differences between the higher 
and lower performing firms (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). This lengthy, iterative process yielded the insights 
that follow.
Results
The analysis led to key insights, summarized in Table 5. 
Overall, our findings indicate that distinctive authority 
structures, incentives systems, and accountability norms 
that are characteristic of family governance shape the 
organization of NPD programs in a way that has not 
been anticipated in prior research and literature. We dis-
cuss these aspects in detail below.
Design of NPD Teams
NPD teams are seen in the literature as the heart of the 
product development process. Contrary to the purported 
benefits of dedicated, cross-functional teams, including 
closer collaboration among diverse team members and 
superior external communication (Clark & Fujimoto, 
1991; Keller, 2001; Van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003), in 
our study, NPD programs using part-time, departmental 
teams outperformed dedicated, cross-functional teams 
with members assigned to the NPD program on a full-
time basis over the course of a project. The analysis pre-
sented below reveals how the governance approach of 
family SMEs led to these unexpected outcomes.
Family Governance at Work in NPD Teams. In higher per-
forming NPD programs, personnel from different 
departments of the firm were assigned to work part-time 
on the innovation projects while continuing to perform 
most of their regular duties and reporting to the depart-
ment head. This is what we call a departmental team 
structure. Conversely, in lower performing NPD pro-
grams, cross-functional project teams staffed with dedi-
cated people drafted from the various functions of the 
firm were created to work full-time on each innovation 
project. Given the complexity and uncertainty typically 
involved in NPD tasks, the departmental team organiza-
tion is often seen as an inadequate design for obtaining 
cross-functional communication and collaboration (e.g., 
Bhuiyan et al., 2004; Cardinal et al., 2011; Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995). Nevertheless, in our informants’ 
view, the departmental team organization encouraged 
rich communication flows and strong collaboration 
among employees across departments, which permitted 
a sufficient degree of overlap between NPD phases. In 
this regard, at CastCo, the CEO repeatedly cited the ben-
efits associated with maintaining a part-time departmen-
tal structure and the important role of family members’ 
authority in favoring informal communication flows and 
cooperation among team members working in diverse 
departments. Similarly, at MountCo, the Head of R&D 
stated:
The employees were always committed to the program’s 
goals . . . they were autonomously willing to cooperate, and 
were also able to effectively balance the projects’ needs 
with the daily requirements of the corporate processes. 
(MountCo, Head of R&D)
Moreover, at MountCo, the CEO emphasized how 
important it was for the success of the NPD program 
“having employees altruistically sharing knowledge . . . 
and proactively seeking solutions across the organiza-
tion as issues emerged during the development phases.”
It is worth noting that PoolCo was an exception in 
this regard because their NPD projects were usually car-
ried out through purposefully created, cross-functional 
teams. However, this exception seemed to be a conse-
quence of the need for contract technicians from outside 
the firm on the team. Setting up a task force staffed with 
people temporarily drafted from the various functions of 
the firm was seen as the only possible way to involve 
outsiders effectively. Moreover, a careful analysis of this 
case showed that employees still maintained an active 
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Table 4. NPD Program Design in the Sampled Companies.
Case 
NPD program design
Team composition Leadership Incentives
CastCo NPD projects moved across 
departments; seven employees 
commonly involved; part-time 
commitment of team members
Two project managers hired as 
project leaders on a full-time 
basis; championing activities 
regularly conducted by an 
external partner; chairman, CEO, 
and another senior manager often 
engaged in internal lobbying for 
resources
The CEO’s brother (senior manager) 
responsible for the innovation 
program; other senior managers 
partially supervised operations; 
no extrinsic incentives for NPD; 
intrinsic incentives to NPD project 
leaders
MountCo Project teams typically overlapping 
with the R&D department; chosen 
employees from other departments 
temporary engaged
Project leaders officially nominated 
for each project; one senior 
manager, two managers recruited 
from other sportswear companies; 
championing and promoting 
activities mainly conducted by the 
Head of Marketing
The CEO served as overall program 
manager; no incentives established 
for team members; compensation 
of project leaders initially linked to 
NPD performance, but abolished 
in 2004
PoolCo NPD projects developed across the 
existing organization; employees 
assigned to projects based on specific 
task requirements
Dedicated project leaders 
appointed; the Head of 
Production filled that role three 
times; replaced by a new project 
leader hired in 2005; championing 
and promoting activities reserved 
to family members
The CEO and the Head of 
Production supervised the NPD 
program; team member salaries not 
linked to NPD performance; no 
formal incentive systems for project 
leaders; nonmonetary awards for 
successful project leaders
FabricCo People dedicated on a full-time basis; 
teams usually composed of the R&D 
employees and additional people from 
the design and marketing offices and 
production
Two junior managers chosen as 
project leaders; championing 
activities mainly conducted by the 
Head of R&D
The Head of Production was 
the main supervisor; a venture 
capitalist also involved; NPD team 
members always provided with 
monetary incentives linked to the 
results of their NPD projects; 
program leaders compensation not 
linked to innovation performance
SecureCo Task force fully dedicated to each 
project; NPD project teams usually 
consisted of five people; varying 
composition with high functional 
diversity
Each project had a dedicated project 
leader, selected from among three 
senior managers; the project 
leaders spontaneously took care 
of championing activities
The Head of the Design Office was 
assigned responsibility for the 
program; monetary incentive system 
for NPD team members; no specific 
incentives for project leaders
BikeCo All NPD project teams composed of 
four employees from the production 
department and one product designer; 
dedicated office; full-time involvement 
of team members until new product 
commercialization
Each NPD project was assigned to a 
project leader; a product designer 
appointed four times, two projects 
assigned to the Head of Production; 
the Head of Production proposed 
himself for conducting championing 
activities
The CEO directly supervised the 
innovation program; no formal 
system of incentives, but ad hoc 
monetary awards promised for 
each NPD project; no incentives to 
NPD project leaders
Note. NPD = new product development.
role in their original departments and worked on proj-
ects on a part-time basis.
But how could firms in our sample achieve these 
positive results when team members remained distant 
from each other and only devoted part of their time to 
NPD projects? Our analysis indicates that this was pos-
sible because of family governance. More specifically, 
the centralized authority and the informal working 
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environment that go along with family governance were 
found to facilitate the coordination and cooperation of 
team members even if they were working in different 
offices. Family managers were found to leverage their 
authority, which is widely accepted throughout the orga-
nization, to act as facilitators, taking steps to coordinate 
NPD across departments, and resolve conflicts between 
NPD and ordinary activities:
It was common to see projects getting stuck at the passage 
from design to production . . . those were tough times for 
me, I didn’t want to fight with department heads each time 
I needed some rework . . . but I could ask some of them 
[family members] for support. . . . They are like an elite, 
they can talk with everyone, and command everyone, 
regardless of roles and departments . . . this helped a lot 
when it came to unlock tensions across departments. 
(CastCo, project leader)
In addition, by continuing to work in their original 
departments, the higher performing firms avoided con-
flict between employees that joined NPD teams and 
those who did not. In fact, team members were often 
able to involve their departmental colleagues on infor-
mal bases when additional assistance was needed to 
accelerate the completion of critical tasks or to resolve 
complex problems. In this respect, the informal organiz-
ing climate that characterized the family approach to 
governance clearly emerged as an asset for higher per-
forming NPD programs. Communication flows across 
departments were indeed facilitated by informal rela-
tionships among employees, such that NPD teams were 
able to access departmental resources and knowledge, 
while rich information flows were obtained by the 
means of informal interactions across departments:
Many of us have worked here for a long time . . . we are 
used to communicating informally. . . . Sometimes they 
[R&D employees] ask me and my close colleagues to give 
them feedback on the features they want to implement in 
new products, and I also often talk with them to understand 
where they were directing our future offering. (MountCo, 
Head of Marketing)
By contrast, a common design found in lower per-
forming NPD programs (FabricCo, SecureCo, and 
BikeCo) was the formation of dedicated, cross-func-
tional teams that normally moved into a new office to 
form a task force. Team members were offered a full-
time role in the NPD projects, and many employees 
aspired to join NPD teams, as this was seen as some-
thing new as well as an opportunity for personal growth. 
However, the criteria used to select team members were 
not well communicated outside the family circle, which 
caused the choices of team members made by program 
supervisors to be questioned. For example, a designer at 
FabricCo complained about a lack of transparency about 
Production Head’s choices:
Even before being a manager, he is an owner, he doesn’t 
need to give explanations . . . when the first project was 
launched, I thought I was the right one to take part to it, and 
I told him, but he had already decided! . . . My colleague 
was chosen, but he doesn’t have half of my experience, I 
Table 5. Summary of Divergences in NPD Program Design Between Higher and Lower Performing NPD Programs.
Case 

























Higher performing NPD programs
CastCo Departmental Part-time Externally recruited No Official Yes No Intrinsic
MountCo Departmental Part-time Externally recruited No Official Yes No No
PoolCo Cross-functional Part-time Externally recruited No Official Yes No Intrinsic
Lower performing NPD programs
FabricCo Cross-functional Dedicated Internally appointed Yes Spontaneous No Extrinsic No
SecureCo Cross-functional Dedicated Internally appointed Yes Spontaneous No Extrinsic No
BikeCo Cross-functional Dedicated Internally appointed Yes Spontaneous No Extrinsic No
Note. NPD = new product development.
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still cannot understand this decision. . . . Well, he is a close 
friend of the Production Head’s cousin [who also works in 
the design office], and that obviously matters. (FabricCo, 
designer)
Such practices created fault lines within departments 
that slowed communication and made collaboration 
more difficult. Furthermore, as teams were formed, 
those excluded were left with extra work. New employ-
ees were sometimes hired to fill the voids but this did 
not completely resolve the problem because given the 
informal working environment that exists in family 
SMEs, the employees who left to join the NPD teams 
were often the only ones who knew the content of the 
jobs. Thus, it was common for team members to be tem-
porarily called back to their departments to help train 
replacement personnel.
The people we hired to replace project team members took 
so long to be autonomous in their tasks . . . even their 
colleagues often did not know how to help them. . . . 
Department heads often needed team members to get back 
for some time, but well, new products are important. 
(FabricCo, Head of Production)
As such, the organizational structure got compli-
cated, generating conflicts between NPD projects and 
ordinary firm activities that appeared more difficult to 
manage given the power of some managers and the lack 
of formalization which characterizes family governance. 
Employees, in turn, saw the choices regarding team 
composition as imposed from above, and were bothered 
by the fact that choices were often made based on per-
sonal preferences. This generated envy and resentment 
by those excluded, such that a barrier grew between 
teams and departments. For example, at FabricCo the 
following situation occurred:
That was kind of frustrating, he often had to run to his old 
office and help his colleagues but, when we needed 
something, going there meant like offending them [the 
colleagues from marketing] . . . it was like we are having 
good time and they have the work to be done, but that 
doesn’t make sense at all because we all need one another. 
(FabricCo, R&D employee)
Also, the preferential treatment of some employees 
over others reduced the ability of department heads and 
family managers to monitor employees’ behavior and 
performance. At SecureCo, for example, the conflicts 
between department employees and those assigned to 
cross-functional NPD project teams escalated to the 
point that the Head of Production, who was serving as a 
project leader, felt he had lost control over production 
employees’ behavior:
Interpersonal jealousy and rivalry emerged between those 
involved in different projects and those working in the 
departments . . . I think that, by losing a clear framework 
for evaluating people and providing feedback, we seriously 
compromised overall employee feelings toward the 
company. . . . We needed everyone’s contribution, but team 
members were isolated by others. (SecureCo, Head of 
Production)
Similarly, informants at FabricCo and BikeCo repeat-
edly lamented the lack of accountability norms regard-
ing how team members approached their job:
One may feel excluded, and also damaged by the 
appointment of a colleague in the NPD team. Those who 
remain have double the work to do, without any support . . . 
the question is, are our increased efforts acknowledged? 
(FabricCo, production manager not involved in NPD 
projects)
It was important to move people from their department to 
the NPD project and vice-versa . . . but they were left with 
too much freedom . . . many of them started free-riding, 
they always had a ready excuse to shirk their duties. 
(BikeCo, NPD project leader)
Finally, in the firms that employed dedicated, cross-
functional teams family owners and managers found the 
cost to exceed the benefits, and thus approached NPD 
projects cautiously. Their attempts to contain costs led 
project leaders and team members in lower performing 
NPD programs to lament the lack of support from senior 
management, which of course was demotivating, and 
had the potential to cause further damage to the cost-
benefit calculus of the program.
Theory Elaboration. Overall, these findings provide 
insights into the role of family governance on the func-
tioning and effectiveness of NPD teams, which are sum-
marized in Table 6. The decisions taken in higher 
performing firms to favor informal information flows 
and a departmental team organization that preserved the 
cohesion of the existing departments and allowed suffi-
cient autonomy to the NPD teams to accomplish project 
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goals were consistent with the authority structures (Car-
ney, 2005; Daily & Dollinger, 1992) and norms of 
accountability (Verbeke & Kano, 2012) of family SMEs 
This choice allowed higher performing firms to leverage 
the interpersonal bonds and the tacit knowledge that pre-
vious research has often emphasized as key strengths of 
the family form of governance (Gedajlovic & Carney, 
2010). Conversely, by designating dedicated cross-func-
tional NPD teams, lower performing firms exhibited 
significant problems in terms of communication and 
collaboration with the rest of the organization. Further-
more, the informal, part-time nature of the more suc-
cessful departmental team structure appeared to be less 
costly than using dedicated cross-functional teams, 
which was consistent with family owners’ incentive for 
efficiency and parsimonious use of firm resources 
(Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). While the use of 
dedicated cross-functional teams to organize NPD proj-
ects is typically considered to be advantageous, in fam-
ily SMEs such teams seem to lead to problems in 
resource duplication, information flows, accountability, 
and cost control.
Design of NPD leadership
The project leader is a crucial agent in NPD programs 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). Project leaders have sev-
eral roles, including the provision of management skills 
(Barczak & Wilemon, 1992), shaping the new product 
concept (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991), and lobbying for 
critical resources and support from top management 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Somech, 2006). Although 









Traditional dimensions of 
NPD team design
Cross-functional teams of dedicated human resources which have functional interaction on a 
full-time basis during the course of a project enable closer collaboration among diverse team 
members and superior external communication (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Keller, 2001; Van der 
Vegt & Janssen, 2003).
Dysfunctional family 
governance mechanisms
•• Team members selection 
based on particularistic 
criteria
•• Excessive costs •• Rivalry and resentment of 
department colleagues
 •• Family managers dispose 
freely of team members
•• Low availability of external 
information
Illustrative quotes “I wonder whether we could obtain the same results by spending less and devolving people to 
projects on a part-time basis” (SecureCo, program supervisor).
 “What did they expect? He [a new employee] was continuously knocking at our door—How can 
I do this? Where can I find that?—That was annoying . . . and how could I say no? He [the family 
member heading the informant’s original department] is the one who decides about my future 
here!” (BikeCo, production employee).
Theory extensions 
emerging from the 
study
NPD programs in family SMEs that design NPD teams by relying on the existing 
departments of the firm and contribute to NPD projects by devoting part of the time 




•• Family managers facilitate 
information flows
•• Less costly, extra-resources 
available when needed
•• Department employees aid 
teams
 •• Family members facilitate 
coordination across 
departments
•• High availability of external 
information
Illustrative quotes “Even if team members do not work in the same function, usually most of them have close 
relationships and have the opportunity to talk and contact each other very often” (CastCo, Head 
of the Design Office).
 “We [family members] are often seen as ‘factotums’, people who know everything and everyone 
. . . we were often able to engage new employees to face specific needs . . . this helped teams to 
address promptly ‘big issues’, and always move the project forward” (MountCo, designer).
Note. SMEs = small and medium enterprises; NPD = new product development.
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these functions can sometimes be carried out effectively 
by a single agent (Ernst, 2002; Howell & Higgins, 
1990), our research suggests that in family SMEs this is 
not the case.
Family Governance at Work in NPD Leadership. The family 
SMEs in our sample faced serious challenges in identi-
fying appropriate project leaders within the pool of man-
agers already working in the organization. The tendency 
toward restricting authority to the family circle, and the 
concurrent informality typical of the family approach to 
governance (Verbeke & Kano, 2012), were generally 
found to constrain the availability of personnel with the 
qualifications, know-how, and commitment to exercise 
effective NPD project leadership. Indeed, inadequate 
project leadership was often mentioned as a cause of 
failure in the lower performing NPD programs, whereas 
higher performing firms found ways to bypass the disad-
vantages of an informal structure.
To begin, higher performing firms addressed leader-
ship issues by searching for managers with the appropri-
ate qualifications from outside the company and 
assigning them to project leadership positions. For 
example, at CastCo, the lack of appropriate people to 
serve as project leaders was realized at the beginning of 
the innovation program. As the CEO recalled:
In 2001 we didn’t have people within the firm who were 
endowed with the skills and freedom needed to 
autonomously manage innovation projects . . . so we 
employed the first senior manager and we assigned to him 
a first project. As the number of projects increased, we 
found other people that could fit the project manager 
position, to which direct responsibility of the innovation 
projects was assigned . . . it was immediately clear to 
everyone that these folks [the externally hired project 
leaders] know what they have to do and how a good project 
has to be run . . . we would not obtain the same results with 
only our people. (CastCo, CEO)
In other cases, project leadership was initially 
assigned to existing managers, but the weaknesses of 
that choice were soon realized and companies changed 
their policy. At MountCo, the first project leader was the 
Head of Marketing, a senior manager working in the 
company since 1994, but two professional managers 
were subsequently brought in to lead NPD teams. 
According to the CEO, bringing in outsiders to carry on 
the project leadership role was crucial. Similarly, at 
PoolCo, the Head of Production served as project leader 
of three projects, but understood that external profes-
sionals could be more effective leaders. He used his 
father’s (the former CEO) professional network to 
recruit an experienced manager from another firm, and 
this turned into a winning move.
I soon realized that my expertise was limited to production 
planning and management. (PoolCo, Head of Production)
I asked my father for help . . . in less than three days . . . a 
friend of his recommended one of their managers . . . he 
proved to well compensate the skills that were not available 
in our organization. (PoolCo, CEO)
Overall, all the higher performing NPD programs 
brought in external professionals to serve as NPD proj-
ect leaders, and this was found to be a suitable strategy 
to bypass the disadvantages related to the informal 
structures associated with family governance. 
Furthermore, in higher performing cases the role of proj-
ect leaders was revised, such that championing activities 
were formally removed from their duties, and were offi-
cially assigned to family members. This allowed the 
family to maintain managerial control while ensuring 
that NPD teams were provided with appropriate 
support.
Our informants pointed to some distinctive traits of 
family governance, especially related to the differences 
between the power of family and nonfamily managers 
that emerged as crucial for understanding the role played 
by family managers officially appointed as project 
champions in the higher performing NPD programs. 
The family managers serving as project champions 
enjoyed high and unfettered organizational authority 
based on their belonging to the family and, when needed, 
they were thus able to use their political influence to 
commit the organization to invest substantial resources 
in NPD projects. For example, at PoolCo, the CEO 
commented:
I always want us [the family] to support NPD activities and 
play politics to sustain and protect NPD teams . . . we see 
the company as an extension of our family ties . . . 
employees recognize us as the dominant group. (PoolCo, 
CEO)
At MountCo, the CEO’s daughter, who was the Head 
of Marketing, was appointed as the NPD champion 
because “He [the CEO] trusts me one hundred percent.” 
In turn, her concern for the firm, family, and employees 
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was recognized by others. Similarly, at CastCo, the 
championing activities were regularly conducted by the 
CEO’s cousin working at a commercial partner firm. 
Although external to the company, the CEO commis-
sioned the cousin to visit the firm weekly, talk with proj-
ect leaders and team members, support the projects 
across the organization, and especially promote the 
innovation projects outside the firm by using his profes-
sional network for the benefit of the family.
On the other hand, in lower performing NPD pro-
grams project leadership was assigned to managers 
already working in the firm. Contrarily to the higher per-
forming cases, all these firms faced persisting problems 
related to the skills and effort of project leaders. For 
example, at FabricCo project leadership was assigned to 
internal managers based on their membership in or rela-
tionships with the family. From interviews with the 
Chairman, it was clear that the choice was not related to 
their skills and experience in managing projects. While 
this may turn out to be a good move in the long term, in 
the short term, the lack of experience of project leaders 
appeared to be a main reason for the unsatisfactory per-
formance of the innovation program.
At BikeCo, appointing internal managers as project 
leaders also resulted in excessive freedom, low account-
ability, and low commitment. For example, the CEO’s 
son (Production Head) was appointed as leader of four 
NPD projects, and he felt free to decide how much time 
to devote to the projects: “I also have to manage my 
department . . . the NPD team members are able to work 
even without me.” The CEO did not take any corrective 
actions, but admitted that the son did not have enough 
time to be fully engaged in the project.
What is more, in lower performing NPD programs, 
project champions were left to emerge spontaneously. In 
particular, employees with high influence on the project 
team (e.g., powerful senior leaders or technocrats) often 
prevailed and established themselves as project champi-
ons owing to their deep involvement in the projects’ 
operations. However, the motivations of nonfamily 
managers were noticeably different from those of family 
members, as they tended to adopt an individualistic atti-
tude and to see championing activities as a way for them 
to climb the organization ladder. For example, at 
FabricCo the Head of Administration was unsatisfied 
with the project champion’s attitude: “A promoter must 
be motivated towards the good of the company, not only 
towards his own career.” A similar situation emerged at 
SecureCo, where the CEO’s offspring serving as Head 
of Production had been explicitly indicated as the right 
person to serve as project champion by the majority of 
interviewees, but was prevented from doing so:
They [nonfamily project champions] were protecting their 
position and prevented me from helping . . . they wanted 
the NPD projects to be their exclusive realm and were 
afraid of losing control over them. (SecureCo, Head of 
Production)
Also, the ability of nonfamily project champions to 
influence family owner-managers was limited. The evi-
dence suggests that they were typically managers with a 
strong technical background, and thus deeply involved 
in operations. However, they lacked the political clout 
with the controlling family needed to obtain adequate 
resources for the NPD projects. For example, at 
FabricCo, the Head of R&D often emerged as project 
champion because “He is the one who best knows our 
products. I thought he would be the most credible one to 
explain the importance of new products to other direc-
tors” (FabricCo, Head of Production). However, the 
other functional heads challenged his authority and 
questioned his abilities on several occasions. Similarly, 
at SecureCo the Head of Production—a family member 
who conducted championing activities in one 
project—admitted:
Non-family members could never obtain the results I 
obtained, they do not have half of the opportunities that I, 
as a family member, have to speak with other people in the 
firm, nor the authority to impose any decision. (SecureCo, 
Head of Production)
Theory Elaboration. Overall, the evidence reported above 
suggests that the concentration of authority in family 
hands (Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2004), plus fam-
ily members’ aversion to sharing power (Gómez-Mejía 
et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2012), generate key chal-
lenges for finding appropriate leaders and champions for 
NPD projects in family SMEs (see Table 7). On the one 
hand, family members often take leadership roles in 
NPD projects, but lack the technical background to fill 
those roles successfully. On the other hand, technocrats 
and other professionals working in the firm who take on 
championing roles were found to often place their per-
sonal goals before the goals of the firm to the detriment 
of the projects they were promoting. Furthermore, they 
had difficulty in gaining the acceptance of top managers 
within the family (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). All of these 
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patterns were observed in the lower performing NPD 
programs. However, in higher performing NPD pro-
grams project leadership and championing were sepa-
rated. The assignment of championing roles to family 
members appears to be a superior design choice in that it 
allows NPD programs to benefit from their authority 
and political power (Carney, 2005), as well as to lever-
age the flexible accountability norms that are typically 
associated with family governance (Gedajlovic et al., 
2004; Schulze et al., 2001) in order to deal with the 
uncertain and long-term nature of the NPD process. At 
the same time, the assignment of project leadership 
responsibilities to external managers helped overcome 
the lack of skilled professional managers in family 
SMEs (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). This approach was 
a good fit with the family form of governance, and thus 
led to superior performance.
Design of NPD Incentives
The use of monetary incentives is a key mechanism for 
ensuring that NPD team members and project leaders 
are committed to project goals and accountable for proj-
ect performance (Griffin, 1997; Page, 1993). However, 
our study indicated that in family SMEs, the use of mon-
etary rewards was associated with lower performance, 
whereas the use of intrinsic incentives, defined as non-
monetary incentives that reward positive innovation 
Table 7. Emerging Insights: Mechanisms Underlying Family Governance in NPD Leadership Design.
Family governance  
attributes
Centralized authority  
structures




Traditional dimensions of 
NPD leadership design
Dysfunctional family 
governance mechanisms  
A single project leader provides management skills, shapes the new product concept, lobbies for 
critical resources, and supports top management (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Barczak & Wilemon, 
1992; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Ernst, 2002; Howell & Higgins, 1990; Somech, 2006).
•• Leadership role assigned to 
family members
•• Insufficient leadership skills
•• Ineffective promotion of 
NPD projects
n/a •• Excessive freedom of project 
leaders
•• Nonfamily champions use 
their acquired salience for 
personal motives 
Illustrative quotes “I wonder whether they are the right people for that position. . . . Sometimes they didn’t even 
know where to begin from, no idea about key steps in project management . . . new products 
could be developed better and faster under the leadership of a senior manager, or, at least, 
someone with some experience about product development” (FabricCo, Head of Production).
 “I don’t have all those skills . . . I felt uncomfortable in this position” (SecureCo, Production Head).
Theory extensions emerging 
from the study
NPD programs in family SMEs that separate project championing from project 
leadership, assigning the former to family members and the latter to externally 
recruited professionals, outperform programs that appoint project leaders from 
within, and allow product champions to emerge spontaneously.
Constructive family 
governance mechanisms
•• Outsiders compensate skill 
deficiencies
n/a •• Project leadership evaluation 
based on objective, 
professional criteria
 •• Family members leverage their 
authority and political clout 
for supporting NPD projects
•• Family champions ensure 
goal alignment
Illustrative quotes “We needed someone from outside, who can be accountable from the entire project, and 
whose career is related to her ability to develop innovative ideas into new products” (CastCo, 
Chairman).
 “Everybody knows she [the CEO’s daughter] is committed to maintaining her family’s and her 
firm’s name in high esteem . . . she is happy when the firm does well and angry when something 
goes wrong . . . people listen to her because she works for the good of all of us” (MountCo, 
CEO).
Note. SMEs = small and medium enterprises; NPD = new product development. The study findings do not indicate mechanisms linking NPD 
leadership design to motivations toward parsimony.
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results with increased individual status and reputation, 
was associated with higher performance. This adds fur-
ther insights into the motivation literature (Amabile, 
1983, 1993), showing that intrinsic motivation can actu-
ally play a very important role in affecting performance, 
particularly for complex tasks involving creativity. Our 
findings also show that such motivation can be under-
mined by extrinsic rewards that lead people to feel exter-
nally controlled in their work.
Family Governance at Work in NPD Incentives. Our analy-
sis illustrated how the characteristics of family gover-
nance reduce the utility of providing monetary incentives 
to project leaders and team members by creating unnec-
essary costs and corroding the relational contracts exist-
ing among agents in these firms.
In higher performing NPD programs, teams and proj-
ect leaders appeared highly committed to NPD project 
goals, although no monetary incentives were imple-
mented. To illustrate, at CastCo, neither project leaders 
nor team members were provided monetary incentives 
tied to innovation performance, which were seen as 
“Not necessary, since managers usually receive bonuses 
in relation to overall firm performance” (CastCo, NPD 
Program Supervisor). Family managers were often 
found to use their privileged position to foster employ-
ees’ attachment to the company and their acceptance of 
family values, which in turn led team members to dis-
play high commitment to NPD project goals:
Our employees share the values of our family, and are fully 
committed to reaching our company’s goals. (CastCo, 
senior manager)
Another reason why higher performing firms were 
reluctant to implement extrinsic incentive schemes for 
NPD project participants was that doing so would 
require that these mechanisms be extended to all family 
members to avoid frictions (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 
2009). But this was seen as redundant and inefficient. In 
a similar vein and more to the point, extrinsic incentives 
tied to innovation programs created conflicts either 
because such incentives were not available to all 
employees or because they created dysfunctional rival-
ries between members of different NPD teams. For 
example, at MountCo, monetary incentives were ini-
tially instituted and then abolished because the CEO 
noted the negative consequences they had on relation-
ships within the organization.
Project managers were well incentivized to be quick in 
developing new products, but I was worried that they were 
too much in competition with each other . . . good and 
collaborative relationship among my people are much 
more important. (MountCo, CEO)
Monetary reward mechanisms specifically tied to an 
NPD program reduced the performance of those pro-
grams in the family-governed firms that used them. Our 
analysis emphasized how the concentration of decision-
making power in the hands of family managers creates 
an informal working environment, where relational con-
tracts tend to accompany or even replace transactional 
contracts among organizational members. These aspects 
were positively emphasized in higher performing cases 
as sources of significant advantages for NPD in terms of 
team member commitment to project goals and ability to 
manage informal knowledge flows. Unfortunately, mon-
etary incentives tended to destroy the foundations of 
such contracts in lower performing NPD programs. In 
this regard, our analysis suggested that monetary 
rewards provoked opportunistic behaviors among team 
members as well as relational conflicts between team 
members and other employees.
In theory these systems can work, but they may be more 
suitable to more depersonalized companies, where directors 
cannot see everything . . . I know everyone personally here, 
and my offspring are my eyes and ears at all times, so I see no 
reason for giving further incentives to anyone. (BikeCo, CEO)
Everybody wanted to participate in those projects, and 
many of those who were excluded took it badly . . . they 
started asking for salary increases, or complaining about 
excessive workloads. . . . That was something new to me, it 
was like a revenge . . . on the other hand, those who joined 
innovation teams were isolated, they were all long-time 
colleagues, even friends, and suddenly a wall was raised 
between them. (SecureCo, production manager not 
involved in NPD projects)
What is more, the analysis of higher performing NPD 
programs revealed just how intrinsic incentives to proj-
ect leaders, such as nominating them as “family ambas-
sadors” or giving them opportunities for increasing their 
public visibility and linking their name to that of the 
company, can be effective in reinforcing the relational 
contracts between managers and family members, as 
well as motivating agents toward the accomplishment of 
project goals. For example, a project manager at PoolCo 
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recognized the value of the intrinsic rewards he received 
at the completion of an NPD project:
After the first project, they [the CEO and the Head of 
Production] were really satisfied, and gave me a salary 
increase of 10% without a request on my part. . . . Well, that 
was unexpected and welcome. . . . The second project was 
a success too, and they again offered a 5% salary increase 
. . . I declined the offer and instead asked them to use that 
budget to hire a new project manager to be placed alongside 
me . . . that made me feel important, and facilitated my 
work. (PoolCo, Project Manager 1)
Theory Elaboration. As summarized in Table 8, the 
evidence suggests that extrinsic incentives linked to NPD 
project performance are redundant, ineffective, and can 
harm both the informal working environment and the 
relationships among employees in family SMEs. More 
specifically, extrinsic incentives of that type are found to 
threaten the authority exerted by family owner-managers 
(Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2004), replacing the 
relational contracts they develop with nonfamily employ-
ees with transactional ones (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
What is more, these monetary rewards aggravated the 
rivalry and envy existing between the employees 
involved in NPD projects and those excluded, and this, in 
turn, reduced goal commitment and collaboration during 
NPD. Conversely, intrinsic incentive schemes seemed to 
boost the performance of NPD programs. Not only were 









Traditional dimensions of 
NPD incentives design
The use of extrinsic incentives in the form of monetary rewards is a key mechanism for ensuring 
that NPD team members and project leaders are committed to project goals and accountable for 
project performance (Griffin, 1997; Page, 1993).
Dysfunctional family 
governance mechanisms
•• Family authority is 
weakened
•• Excessive and irregular 
personnel costs
•• Excessive competition 
between team members and 
other employees
 •• Transactional logics replace 
relational contracts
•• Relational conflicts across 
teams and functions
Illustrative quotes “Now I see how variable compensation can be dangerous, because we don’t use them in other 
departments . . . a bonus, when merited, makes an employee happy, but variable pay makes him 
greedy . . . I want people to work for passion, not for money” (BikeCo, Chairman).
 “Team members became too isolated from the remaining organization, many of them have lost 
the link with us [the family], their actions became only driven by money . . . their department 
colleagues, in turn, were often not collaborative, it was clear that something was broken between 
teams and others . . . when we gave people criteria, they worked up to them and lost sight of the 
big picture” (FabricCo, CEO).
Theory extensions 
emerging from the study
NPD programs in family SMEs that use intrinsic incentive schemes outperform those 




•• Team members and project 
leaders augment their sense 
of belonging to the family 
and to the company
•• Avoid unnecessary 
personnel costs
•• Relational contracts are 
reinforced
Illustrative quotes “A non-monetary reward may be very effective, since the best managers have the opportunity 
to improve their professional and social status by associating their name with their innovation 
projects’ output, and also with our [the family’s] name . . . they increase their belonging to the 
company, and this can be used as a means of personal fulfillment . . . these kinds of rewards build 
trust and respect, they are much more effective [than monetary incentives] in creating a long-
term relationship” (CastCo, Chairman).
 “We are already spending a lot of money in innovation, and the recruitment of two external 
managers is at the limit of our possibilities . . . employees are aware that a success in NPD would 
represent new opportunities for all of them, I think that a good salary is sufficient to guarantee a 
high level of motivation” (PoolCo, CEO).
Note. SMEs = small and medium enterprises; NPD = new product development.
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they costless and thus more consistent with the family 
firms’ motivation toward efficiency and parsimony (e.g., 
Gedajlovic et al., 2004) but these mechanisms seemed to 
reinforce rather than damage the relational contracts 
between the family and nonfamily employees working in 
NPD. This is important since such relationships are both 
integral to the family form of governance and fragile, 
owing to the differences in status among family and non-
family members. Furthermore, intrinsic rewards helped 
maintain high commitment to NPD goals without the 
negative spillovers among nonfamily personnel who 
were not chosen to participate in the NPD projects.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study has drawn on the family business and product 
development literatures to extend existing theory on 
innovation in family firms by showing how family 
SMEs can organize high-performing NPD programs. 
Family governance entails characteristics such as cen-
tralized authority structures, incentives for parsimony, 
and asymmetrical accountability norms (Carney, 2005; 
Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Gedajlovic et al., 2012). Our 
analysis suggests that, in order to achieve high NPD pro-
gram performance, family SMEs must design their NPD 
programs to match the distinctive features of their gov-
ernance system. The design principles that emerged 
from our study diverge in important ways from conven-
tional wisdom regarding NPD design. Overall, these 
results contribute new insights into effective innovation 
management in family firms, and shed light on some 
meaningful intervening mechanisms that link family 
firms’ efforts in product development and their innova-
tion performance.
Theoretical Extensions and Contributions
The results of our analysis provided a convergent set of 
insights. As illustrated in Tables 6, 7, and 8, the central-
ized authority structures, motivation toward parsimony, 
and asymmetrical accountability norms that characterize 
the family approach to governance (Carney, 2005; 
Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Gedajlovic et al., 2012) can 
engender either positive or negative outcomes during 
the process of product development, depending on how 
NPD programs are designed.
With regard to the composition of NPD teams and the 
implementation of incentive systems for team members, 
our results considerably diverge from prior research on 
product development in that the design of dedicated 
cross-functional NPD teams (Bhuiyan et al., 2004; 
Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; 
Keller, 2001), and the provision of extrinsic incentives 
for team members (Ernst, 2002; Schilling & Hill, 1998) 
were found to be associated with lower, rather than 
higher, NPD performance. More specifically, our find-
ings suggest that these approaches to NPD design are 
inconsistent with the governance attributes of family 
SMEs and, as a result, accentuate their structural weak-
nesses. Family SMEs that use conventional NPD designs 
are unable to muster adequate levels of human or finan-
cial resources and face severe conflicts between innova-
tion activities and organizational routines, aspects that 
have been emphasized in the literature as inherent weak-
nesses of family governance (Gedajlovic & Carney, 
2010; Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
However, product innovation can be achieved in family 
SMEs when NPD programs are designed in a way that is 
conducive to their governance attributes, such as retain-
ing the relational ties of team members with their home 
departments while they work part-time on the innova-
tion projects, and providing intrinsic rather than extrin-
sic incentives. The companies we studied that adopted 
such approaches experienced advantages, such as lever-
aging the strong interpersonal bonds and the tacit knowl-
edge that previous research has often emphasized as key 
strengths of the family form of governance (Gedajlovic 
& Carney, 2010).
In other aspects of NPD program design, especially 
those related to the identification and deployment of lead-
ership roles in NPD projects, our results did not contradict 
prior product development literature, but instead add 
important insights that extend our understanding of how 
leadership issues determine NPD program performance 
in family SMEs. Prior literature has attributed several 
responsibilities to project leaders, including developing a 
vision (Lewis et al., 2002; Sarin & McDermott, 2003), 
managing the program (Lewis et al., 2002), and champi-
oning (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Our findings con-
firmed the importance of these tasks, but suggest that in 
family SMEs a single project leader can seldom handle all 
of them, because those who excel in managerial and tech-
nical skills are not likely to possess the required authority 
or social capital for conducting championing activities, 
and vice versa. In fact, the family SMEs in our sample 
that obtained the best results adapted their NPD program 
design to take into account the specific challenges engen-
dered by family governance. More specifically, this meant 
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separating the leadership and championing roles, and 
assigning the former to external (nonfamily) profession-
als and the latter to family managers. By doing so, the 
more successful firms in our sample were able to com-
pensate for the skill deficiencies that often accompany the 
governance approach of family firms (Gedajlovic & 
Carney, 2010), while leveraging the political clout and 
positive reputation of family members.
To sum up, our study contributes to the literature in 
the following ways. First, our results shed light on the 
distinctive challenges and dilemmas posed for innova-
tion activities in family-owned and -managed firms, and 
specifically point to the importance of attaining a good 
fit between the design of NPD programs and the gover-
nance of a firm in order to achieve superior performance 
in product innovation. Prior NPD research has either 
embraced universal models of designing NPD programs 
that do not take into account differences in governance 
attributes (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995; Ernst, 2002) or proposed contin-
gency models focusing on the interactions between NPD 
design and the technological environment in which it 
takes place (Cardinal et al., 2011; Tatikonda & Montoya-
Weiss, 2001). By emphasizing the role of firm gover-
nance in SMEs and by explaining how the family 
governance systems interacts with the design of NPD 
programs in producing meaningful consequences for 
NPD performance, our study complements this body of 
work, adding important insights into the challenges and 
opportunities for innovation in family SMEs.
Second, our study extends prior research on family 
governance and its attributes, a literature that provides 
ample discussion of the key governance attributes of 
family firms (Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; 
Gedajlovic et al., 2004) but has not explicitly examined 
how these attributes influence key organizational activi-
ties such as NPD. Specifically, our study has illustrated 
the role the family form of governance plays in the 
design and performance of product innovation. By doing 
so, we complement macro-perspectives such as agency 
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Herrero, 2011), that pro-
vide only a partial view of firm governance largely 
based on simple dyadic principal–agent relationships 
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003; Connelly, Hoskisson, 
Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Instead, 
we offer a more complete view of how family gover-
nance works in practice by focusing on the design of 
NPD programs and illustrating how interactions between 
and among principals and agents affect key organiza-
tional processes such as product innovation.
Finally, our study contributes insights into unique 
success factors for product innovation in family SMEs 
that extend, and sometimes even contradict, classic 
approaches for organizing NPD (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1995; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995; Ernst, 2002). Most 
prior work has been conducted on large-scale, profes-
sionally managed organizations, or within simulated 
environments. By considering NPD in firms where fam-
ily governance plays a significant role in shaping orga-
nizational structures, strategies, and outcomes (Chrisman 
et al., 2012; Gedajlovic et al., 2004), our study points to 
an alternative model of success that includes organiza-
tion of NPD teams on a part-time basis, while maintain-
ing existing departmental structures, separation of 
leadership and championing roles, and application of 
intrinsic incentives in place of extrinsic incentives to 
foster teamwork and stronger goal alignment. Overall, 
these NPD design features seem to lead to higher inno-
vation performance in family SMEs.
Implications and Limitations
The results of this study have important implications for 
research on product innovation in family firms. First, we 
provide theoretical arguments and evidence suggesting 
that family governance represents a context leading to 
unique challenges in product innovation programs. 
Future research is needed to determine if our proposi-
tions hold for family firms in general, especially those in 
different environmental contexts. Furthermore, it would 
be useful to determine whether the governance attributes 
examined in this study hold for other modes of innova-
tion and entrepreneurship (e.g., licensing, technology 
outsourcing, corporate venturing). Second, this study 
suggests that governance is an important element to be 
accounted for in future product innovation research. In 
this article, we focus in particular on family governance, 
but future research should study how other forms of 
governance interact with product innovation design, for 
example, among small firms and new ventures, to 
explain the link between NPD design and innovation 
performance in these firms.
The study also has implications for management 
practice. In particular, our analysis suggests that the 
owners and managers of family SMEs should not pre-
suppose the universal applicability of the prescriptions 
that product innovation management handbooks pro-
pose. Instead, they should carefully analyze how the 
particularities of their firm’s governance affect the man-
agement of product innovation programs and how those 
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programs should be structured to best capitalize on the 
distinctive characteristics of their firms. In this study, we 
have identified the potential value of the departmental 
organization of NPD teams whereby team members 
continue to work in their departments while working 
part-time on the innovation projects; the division of 
project leadership and championing among nonfamily 
and family managers, respectively; and the use of intrin-
sic rather than extrinsic incentives. Such approaches to 
NPD design appear to be a better fit for the governance 
attributes that are commonly found in family SMEs. 
However, there are undoubtedly other factors that could 
vary depending on a firm’s specific governance struc-
ture, such as when new products should be developed in 
existing departments or in new corporate ventures.
Naturally, the article has several limitations. First, 
owing to the nature of the research design, our results can-
not be statistically generalized without further empirical 
studies on the determinants of product innovation perfor-
mance in family SMEs. Our conclusions are derived from 
evidence found in family SMEs. Future research is needed 
to examine the boundary conditions of our theory, espe-
cially to what extent the mechanisms and outcomes 
observed in our study can be generalizable in the context 
of smaller family enterprises that do not have a formal 
departmental structure in place or large family-influenced 
companies. Moreover, future research is needed to assess 
to what extent our findings can be applied to other con-
texts, such as entrepreneurial teams that possess similar 
governance attributes to family firms on some dimen-
sions and vary in other respects. Nevertheless, the insights 
we have provided into the processes and mechanisms that 
link family governance to product innovation perfor-
mance are worthy of further testing.
Second, we focused on the performance of the entire 
NPD program and on endogenous factors that influence 
its effectiveness. Future research could also study proj-
ect-level factors and exogenous antecedents of product 
innovation performance in family-governed firms.
Finally, we studied organizational activities underlying 
the development of new products without attempting to 
differentiate the nature of the innovations, which appeared 
to be largely of the continuous, incremental, and exploit-
ative variety. Indeed, it is possible that our results are 
partly driven by the fact that the family SMEs in our sam-
ple did not engage in the full range of innovative activities 
often found in larger firms where the conventional wis-
dom about NPD design was developed (Rosenbusch et al., 
2011). Future research is needed to extend our findings by 
exploring how NPD designs in family firms vary when 
different types of innovations, such as discontinuous 
(König et al., 2013), radical (Nieto et al., 2015), and 
explorative (Patel & Chrisman, 2014) are concerned.
Appendix
Abbreviated Interview Guide
Information on the Firm’s Background.Foundation, firm 
information (size, businesses, industry, geographical 
location, products and services commercialized, main 
financial figures).
Family Involvement.Ownership, generation, family mem-
bers involved in management and employment. CEOs’ 
perception that the firm is a family business.
NPD Program Background.Period of analysis, main goals, 
budget, and projects (number, examples).
NPD Program Performance.Consistent with the preestab-
lished long-term goals, sales trends, market share and 
profitability during the period of analysis, perceptions of 
performance as compared with competitors, senior man-
agement perception of innovative performance.
NPD Program Design.Assessment of various design 
aspects, following the classification of NPD design fac-
tors in Brown and Eisenhardt (1995), including NPD 
teams, leadership, and incentives. Examples of ques-
tions: Who was included in NPD teams? Did you sys-
tematically appoint leaders for NPD projects? How did 
you choose project leaders? Did you implement incen-
tive systems? For whom? What kind of incentives? For 
each of these aspects, please discuss how the NPD pro-
gram was designed, also providing examples of single 
NPD projects; why was this design option chosen? By 
whom? Please discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
this design engendered for product development activi-
ties, including factual examples.
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